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I. INTRODUCTION
"'While we yet hold and do not yield our opposing beliefs, there is a
higher duty than the one we owe political party.... This is America, and
we put country before party .'" The saga prompting this remark was a
thirty-six-day-long battle between Republicans and Democrats for the
United States' presidency, fought twice before the Supreme Court.! That
battle will most likely etch the year 2000 upon the minds of many as an
election year. Perhaps many will forget that in the same year the partisan
bandying paused while political parties joined forces to oppose primary
election law that threatened to meld their opposing beliefs into more
moderate views embodied in primary election victors.' Signaling that party
members could ultimately decide who to place in command of their ranks,
the United States Supreme Court handed down their decision in California
Democratic Party v. Jones, invalidating the blanket primary' and bolstering
political parties' constitutional rights.'
This note will examine the Supreme Court's decision in Jones and
discuss its potential implications. Part 1I first traces the history of political
parties' rights to freedom of association and subsequently discusses the
history of parttisan blanket primaries Part III briefly overviews the facts of
1. Jeanne Cummings, Election 2000: Gore Ends Quest and Concedes the Presidency, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 14, 2000, at A16 (quoting Vice President Al Gore's remarks in his concession speech
recognizing Governor George W. Bush as the victor of the United States' presidential race).
2. Vanessa Blum, Election 2000: 36 Days of Legal Battle, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at 11.
3. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
4. Id. at 585-86.
5. See generally Gary D. Allison, Protecting Party Purity in the Selection of Nominees for
Public Office: The Supremes Strike Down California's Blanket Primaries and Endanger the Open
Primaries of Many States, 36 TULSA L.J. 59 (2000).
6. See infra notes 11-69 and accompanying text.
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the case.7 Part IV outlines the three opinions by the Court: Justice Scalia's
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, and Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion! Part V discusses three possible impacts of the
Court's decision: invalidation of blanket primaries and the questionable
vitality of other primary systems, limitation of political parties' power to
place candidates on the general ballot, and evaluation of both the formation
and judicial review of initiatives The article concludes in Part VI.' °
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Political Parties' Rights of Association
The Framers of the Constitution were split on the subject of political
party formation and its benefits or detriments to the United States."
Notwithstanding the debate, political parties were formed early in the United
States' history as a means to disseminate information and gain support for
legislation.12 Even as the role of political parties changed, they were
characterized as little more than clubs that selected delegates and nominees
using unregulated rules set by ward bosses who single-handedly determined
who would gain access to party conventions and caucuses.'3 Political parties
in the United States have expanded to networks of thousands, run like
multimillion-dollar corporations. Political parties' inherent ties to
government have often made the determination of their constitutional rights
problematic."
The constitutional right to freedom of association in the First" and
Fourteenth" Amendments not only allows individuals to join together to
further common political beliefs but also allows individuals to limit the
association to only those people with the commonly held beliefs. 7 Thus,
7. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 78-140 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 141-193 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 194-195 and accompanying text.
11. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE TRANSFORMATION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERALISM, 12-16 August (1986).
12. Seeid.
13. Adam Winkler, Voters' Rights and Parties; Wrongs: Early Political Party Regulation in the
State Courts, 1886-1915, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 876 (2000).
14. See Nathaniel Persily, The Legal Regulation of Party Nomination Methods: California
Democratic Party v. Jones, John McCain, and Beyond, 5 (2000) at
http://pro.harvard.edu/abstracts/085/085002PersilyNat.htm.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000) (citing Democratic Party of United
States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)).
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political parties, if afforded the right to freedom of association, could limit
their membership to whomever they saw fit.'8
Determining whether or not parties are protected under the Constitution
has often been viewed as a question of whether parties are private or public
associations.'9
If political parties are 'pure' state actors, then they have no First
Amendment rights to association... [a]nd if they are 'pure' private
associations then constitutional restrictions such as the Equal
Protection Clause would not apply to them, and the state might only
be able to regulate their membership with laws narrowly tailored
toward the achievement of compelling state interests.0
Neither extreme being completely attractive, the Court has labeled
political parties according to the issues in particular cases.2' In the White
Primary Cases, the Supreme Court held that political parties were public
actors, and their actions were restricted as such by the Court.23 Yet, political
parties are seemingly private institutions with regard to the freedom of
association that they have been afforded under the Constitution.2,
18. See id.
19. Persily, supra note 14, at 5.
20. Id.
21. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical
Inquiry, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1741, 1751-54 (1993). Lowenstein argues that
[T]he terms 'public' and 'private'... actually function as post hoc labels, rather than as
the a priori analytical devices that conventional doctrine supposes them to be.. We have
seen that the distinction leads to perverse results, for it permits parties either to be subject
to constitutional rights or to bear them, but not both ....
Id. at 1753-54.
22. The cases usually assembled under this heading are Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Grovey v.
Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
526 (1927) and represent the Court's willingness to strike down numerous attempts by the state
legislature, political parties, and private groups to prevent African Americans from voting in the
Democratic primary by ruling that nomination of the party's candidates constituted state action. See
Persily, supra note 14, at 6.
23. Persily, supra note 14, at 6; Lowenstein, supra note 21, at 1748.
24. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-91 (1975) (recognizing associational rights
of parties and holding that the state's interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process was
not compelling enough to overcome the political party's right to selection of delegates); see also,
e.g., Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 125-26
(1981) (holding that Wisconsin violated the party's constitutional rights by compelling it to seat a
delegation in a manner contrary to the party's rules); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479
U.S. 208, 215-26, 225, 229 (1986) (holding that the state's closed primary violated the party's right
to freedom of association and that the party could permit unaffiliated voters to cast votes for its
candidates).
The Supreme Court has had many occasions to define the scope of
political parties' rights of free association." One seminal case is Democratic
Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette.6 In La Follette,
the Democratic Party's manner of voting at their own national convention
was at stake." The Democratic Party's charter provided that only registered
Democrats could choose delegates to attend the National Democratic
Convention. 8 In Wisconsin, delegates were indeed chosen by party
members in caucuses.29 Wisconsin law, however, instituted a primary
election system in which voters did not have to declare their party
affiliations." Moreover, the state law provided that convention delegates
were required to cast votes at the national conventions according to the
results of the primary elections.' The National Democratic Party refused to
seat Wisconsin delegates who were obligated to cast their votes for party
nominees in accordance with the wishes of non-party primary voters.32 The
Court clarified, that contrary to the Wisconsin Supreme Court analysis, the
issue was not whether Wisconsin's open primary was constitutional.3
Rather, the issue was "whether the State may compel the National Party to
seat a delegation chosen in a way that violates the rules of the Party."'  The
test applied by the Court required first, a determination of whether the state
law severely burdened a recognized constitutional right and second, whether
or not the burden was justified by a compelling state interest." The La
Follette Court held that parties' rights of free association allowed them, and
not the state, to choose the manner in which convention delegates would
vote.36
25. See, e.g., Cousins, 419 U.S. at 477; La Follette, 450 U.S. at 107; Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 208.
26. 450U.S. 107(1981).
27. See id. at 109.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 112.
30. Id. at 110-11.
31. Id. at 112.
32. Id. at 113.
33. Id. at 120-21.
34. Id. at 121.
35. See id. 123-25. This test follows conventional First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis and
is the test used in most subsequent decisions explored in this Note. See Lowenstein, supra note 21,
at 1745-46.
36. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 126. The Court cited Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975),
for the proposition that the state's interest in regulating the "election process cannot be deemed
compelling in the context of the selection of delegates to the National Party Convention." La
Follette 450 U.S. at 121. This holding was premised on the associational rights of parties, and the
Court noted that .' [a]ny interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference
with the freedom of its adherents."' Id. at 122 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957)).
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Interestingly, political parties are not always attempting to limit their
membership to affiliated voters. 7 In Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Connecticut,31 the Republican Party instituted a measure that allowed
independent voters-those not affiliated with any political party-to vote in
Republican primary elections.39 Connecticut, however, employed a closed
primary system in which voters had to declare their party affiliation in order
to vote."0 The Tashjian Court held that political parties' constitutional rights
allowed the Republican Party to associate with independent voters by
allowing independents to vote in Republican primary elections.' The Court
reasoned that "the act of formal enrollment or public affiliation with the
Party is merely one element in the continuum of participation in Party
affairs, and need not be in any sense the most important."42 Thus, making
contributions, volunteering time, or formerly registering with a party are a
few ways to associate with it, and after the Tashjian decision, voting in the
party's primary, when invited to do so, is another permissible way to
associate with it.
43
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee41 is another
landmark case defining political parties' constitutional rights of association
and how those rights pertain to primary elections. In Eu, California law
made it illegal for "any primary candidate, or person on her behalf,
[including political parties' governing bodies] to claim that she is the
officially endorsed candidate of the party."46 The Court recognized that it
was possible for a candidate to win the primary election and become a
political party's nominee although the candidate's views were contrary to
those of the political party.47 The Court stated that "[a] State's broad power
37. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 212. Seven years prior to adopting this rule, the Republican party opposed an
independent voter in Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 429 U.S. 989
(1976), who was attempting to assert his right to vote in the Republican primary. The Nader Court
upheld the constitutionality of Connecticut's closed primary that required voters to affiliate with a
party before voting in its primary. Id. at 850; see also Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 212.
40. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 210-11.
41. Id. at 225.
42. Id. at 215.
43. See id.
44. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 217 (citing Cal. Elec. Code § 29430 (West 1977)). The Eu Court addressed a
California law that regulated political parties' internal processes. See id. This Note, however,
focuses primarily on the Court's decision with regard to California laws that restricted political
parties' actions in primary election campaigns.
47. Id.
to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections 'does not extinguish the
State's responsibility to observe the limits established by the First
Amendment rights of the State's citizens."''' Accordingly, the Court held
that the California laws prohibiting political parties from endorsing primary
candidates not only infringed the party's freedom of speech but also violated
their freedom of association without a compelling state interest to justify the
burden.49
While these prior cases broadened the rights of political parties, the
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of parties' freedom of association in
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.5" In Timmons, Minnesota law
prohibited candidates from appearing on the ballot for more than one
political party-a process know as fusion.' The New Party brought suit when
its candidate for office, also the candidate of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor
Party, was denied access to the ballot.52 The New Party claimed that its First
Amendment right to freedom of association was violated.53 The Timmons
Court held that the New Party's rights of association were not severely
burdened stating "[the State's] laws do not restrict the ability of the New
Party and its members to endorse, support, or vote for anyone they like ...
[or] directly limit the party's access to the ballot."54  The Court further
reasoned that the state's prohibition of placing fusion candidates on the
ballot was adequately justified by the state's interest in ballot integrity and
political stability.5
48. Id. at 222 (quoting Tashjian 479 U.S. at 217).
49. Id. at 224, 229.
50. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
51. Timmons at 353-54. "'Fusion,' also called 'cross-filing' or 'multiple-party nomination,' is
the 'electoral support of a single set of candidates by two or more parties."' Id. at 354 (quoting
Argersinger, A Place on the Ballot: Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287,
288 (1980) and Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 197-98 ( 8th Cir. 1996)
(defining fusion as "the nomination by more than one political party of the same candidate for the
same office in the same general election.")).
52. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 354.
53. Id. at 355.
54. Id. at 363. Due to the fact that the political party's rights were not severely burdened, the
Court applied a less stringent standard that required the state to show only that their interests were
"sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation." Id. at 364.
55. Id. at 365-69 (noting Minnesota's interests-preventing the ballot from becoming a means for
candidates and parties to exploit advertisement-like slogans and preventing minor parties from
circumventing ballot access laws by bootstrapping on major-party candidates-were specific and
justified the fusion ban). Contra William R. Kirschner, Note, Fusion and the Associational Rights of
Minor Political Parties, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 683, 711-12 (1995) (stating that "a state determined to
maintain both the integrity of the election process and the stability of the political system would be
ill-advised to outlaw multiple party nomination," because fusion creates competition between
political parties instead of within them by allowing minor parties to band together as allies against
major parties).
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While the Court has had several opportunities to define the parameters
of political parties' rights to freedom of association, the prior cases represent
the pivotal decisions and showcase the Court's reasoning.
B. The History of Blanket Primaries
Various processes exist-conventions, caucuses, and elections-whereby
political parties select their nominees for office. Primary elections were
initiated in order to influence candidates who were previously beholden to
powerful political party leaders instead of to the electorate. 6 The three most
common types of primaries are closed, open, and blanket. 7  Closed
primaries are those that require a voter to declare party affiliation prior to the
primary and limit voters to casting votes for that party alone. 8 Open
primaries require voters to declare on the day of voting the one party for
which they will cast their votes but do not require a previous or subsequent
affiliation with that party. 9 In a blanket primary, voters are not limited to
voting for only one party but may cast votes for any candidate regardless of
the voter's or the candidate's party affiliation.' A blanket primary is the
least restrictive type of primary, followed by the open primary.' Some
states do not institute one pure form of primary but instead employ
characteristics from the various types of primaries."
Traditionally, voter turnout for primary elections has rarely exceeded 35
percent of eligible voters.6' Additionally, conventional wisdom says that
primary voters tend to be those with more ideologically extreme positions.'
56. John R. Petrocik, The Blanket Primary: Candidate Strategy, Voter Response, and Party
Cohesion, 4 (2000) at http://pro.harvard.edu/abstracts/035/035008PetrocikJo.htm (appearing in a
volume forthcoming from Bruce Cain and Elizabeth Gerber, editors, consolidating papers prepared
for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington,
D.C. August 30-September 3, 2000).
57. Jason M. Miller, Chapter 18 and the 2000 Presidential Primary Election: Undermining the
Purpose Behind the "Open" Primary Act, 31 McGEORGE L. REv. 399, 401 (2000).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 402.
61. See id. at 401-02.
62. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and Representation, 14
J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 304, 307 (1998) (listing states' forms of primaries including Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusettes, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Rhode Island that all institute
hybrid forms of primaries); see, e.g, Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn. 479 U.S. 208 (1986)
(upholding a semi-closed primary that allowed independent voters to join a party's primary when
invited by the party to do so).
63. Petrocik, supra note 56, at 4.
64. Id.
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Thus, in an effort to increase voter participation and diversify participants in
primary elections, states have experimented with various forms of
primaries.65 The blanket primary, proponents advance, is a system that
66
encourages more moderate voters to participate in elections, prevents
candidates from taking extreme views that they do not necessarily hold but
find necessary to espouse in order to get support from primary voters,67 and
allows voters not affiliated with a political party to participate." California
adopted the blanket primary system in 1996 through initiative. 9
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jones is based upon an initiative, Proposition 198,7 that California
voters passed in 1996."1 Pursuant to the new law, California's primary
election system changed from a closed system to a blanket system.72
Proponents of Proposition 198"3 claimed that a blanket primary would
increase voter participation and nominate candidates who were reflective of
a greater portion of the electorate." Several plaintiffs including the
California Democratic Party, California Republican Party, 5 Libertarian Party
of California, and Peace and Freedom Party opposed the measure76 and filed
65. See Gerber & Morton, supra note 62, at 304.
66, See id.
67. See id.
68. Brief for Respondent at 43-45, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
69, Cal. Democratic Party v Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000).
70. Proposition 198 was codified in Cal. Elec. Code §§ 2001, 2151 (West 1996 and West Supp.
2000).
71. Jones, 530 U.S. at 570.
72. Id.
73. Although proponents have diversified since the inception of Proposition 198, "the California
Open Primary Initiative, began as a self-serving attempt by one politician to improve his chances in
gaining access to the general election ballot. Congressman Tom Campbell, a moderate Republican
who had lost an earlier Senatorial primary to a more conservative opponent, saw in the blanket
primary an opportunity to moderate the primary electorate of his own party and thereby increase his
chance of victory in the primary." Persily, supra note 14, at 32 (citing Charles Price, The Virtual
Primary, CAL. J., Nov. 1, 1995 at 11 and Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, Why Lundgren, So Far, Has Only
Attracted Republicans, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1998, at M6).
74. Brief for Respondent at 39-40, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). Contra
Brief for Petitioner at 38, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (claiming that
Respondents' proposition that blanket primaries will produce candidates more reflective of the
electorate is actually a subterfuge for producing more moderate candidates).
75. The California Republican Party was an intervening plaintiff. Cal. Democratic Party v.
Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
76. Submitting a brief of amicus curiae, in support of neither party, The Brennan Center For
Justice at New York University School of Law outlined the arguments put forth by the opposition of
blanket primaries who claim that "[l]imiting participation to party loyalists ... leads to the selection
of candidates that provide the electorate with a clear choice on the issues, preserves the major parties
from sabotage or strategic voting, and strengthens the ability of party activists to function at the
grassroots level." Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Brennan Center For Justice at 10-11, Cal.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
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a complaint against California's Secretary of State, Bill Jones, claiming that
the new primary system violated their constitutional rights of freedom of
association.77
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINIONS
A. Procedural History
While the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California recognized that voters not affiliated with a party would participate
in its primary and that this might result in the nomination of a candidate
different from one that the party might choose, it held that the blanket
primary did not severely burden parties' rights and that the state interest in
creating a more democratic election process justified any slight burden.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed and adopted the District Court's opinion. 9
B. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
The issue in Jones was whether the blanket primary was a constitutional
means to select a political party's nominee for office."0 The Court applied
the conventional test espoused in Timmons requiring states to prove that
regulations were narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest
when those regulations imposed a severe burden on the constitutional right
to freely associate."
1. The Blanket Primary - A Severe Burden
Justice Scalia's opinion first turned to whether California's blanket
primary severely burdened political parties' rights of association. 2 The
77. Jones, 530 U.S. at 571. Californians for an Open Primary joined the litigation at the trial
level as an intervening defendant. Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1292.
78. Jones, 530 U.S. at 571. Although District Court Judge David Levi is highly respected, the
opponents of Proposition 198 speculated that Judge Levi may have allowed political concerns
regarding the judicial review of initiatives to influence his decision. Peter Schrag, The Initiative, the
Courts and the Crocodile in the Bathtub, PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT, Sept. 2000, at 3, available at
http://www.igs.berkeley.edu:8880/publications/par/Sept2000/shrag.html; see also infra Part VC and
accompanying notes.
79. Jones, 530 U.S. at 571.
80. Id. at 569.
81. Id. at 582.
82. Id. at 572-80.
Court recognized that states have a right to regulate and monitor the election
process.83 Turning to earlier decisions, the Court stated that for example,
"[s]tate[s] may require parties to use the primary format for selecting their
nominees, in order to assure that intraparty competition is resolved in a
democratic fashion."8 Justice Scalia noted, however, that the process by
which parties nominate their candidates-whether a primary or other form of
nomination-is not a wholly public affair over which states have supreme
control." Instead, states must take into consideration the constraints of the
Constitution and the rights of political parties that flow from it.88 Relying on
prior decisions, the Court reiterated that political parties have a
constitutional right under the First Amendment to freely associate and to
limit their association to people with common goals and ideals. 7 Justice
Scalia emphasized the significance of the issue by stating "[i]n no area is the
political association's right to exclude more important than in the process of
selecting its nominee."8
Not surprisingly after that characterization, the Court held that
"Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with-to have their
nominees, and hence their position, determined by-those who, at best, have
refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated
with a rival," and thus, severely burdened parties' constitutional rights.
2. Non-Compelling Nature And Application Of The State's Interests
Necessarily, Justice Scalia turned to the issue of whether a narrowly
tailored, compelling state interest justified the burden. 8  Respondents
advanced seven state interests: elect moderate candidates, force political
parties to appeal to a broader base, give disenfranchised people an
opportunity to vote, promote fairness, offer the electorate more choices,
increase voter participation, and protect voter privacy-claiming that each, by
its compelling nature, justified the institution of the blanket primary."
Justice Scalia reduced the first two interests to "a stark repudiation of
freedom of political association" because they discouraged political parties
from selecting nominees whose ideals were contrary to majoritarian views.92
83. Id. at 572.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 572-73.
86. See id. at 572.
87. Id. at 574 (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214-15 (1986) and
Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)).
88. Jones, 530 U.S. at 575.
89. Id. at 577.
90. Id. at 582.
91. Id. at 582-84.
92. Id. at 582-83 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
515 U.S. 557 (1995) in which the Court rejected a similar interest when it determined that an
328
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Thus, Justice Scalia concluded these interests were not legitimate, let alone
compelling.
93
The third interest proffered by Respondents was that the blanket primary
provided disenfranchised people an effective vote." The disenfranchised
citizens to whom the state referred were independent voters and those
affiliated with minority parties in safe districts 5 who would not be allowed
to cast a meaningful vote for their choice of representative.96 Citing Tashjian
and Nader, Justice Scalia admonished the state that a voter's desire to
participate in a primary election did not supercede a party's right to limit its
association even if the state supported the voter's desire. 7 Discounting
Respondents' argument that closed primaries substantially burdened
minority voters in safe districts,"8 Justice Scalia noted that minority voters
were not disenfranchised because they could simply register with the
majority party."
The remaining state interests-"promoting fairness, affording voters
greater choice, increasing voter participation, and protecting privacy"-
reflected possibly legitimate state interests but not compelling ones.' °° The
Court assumed that the fairness argument referred to the inability of minority
voters in safe districts to vote in a meaningful way against a majority party
candidate and determined that greater unfairness would result by allowing
unaffiliated voters to determine a party's nominee."'
Next, the Court rejected Respondents' argument that the blanket
primary afforded voters a broader choice of candidates because actually,
"openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual [group] (GLIB)" could not compel a veterans' group to allow
GLIB to march in the St. Patrick's Day parade, because such compulsion basically forced a group to
change the content of their message in accordance with the message preferred by others). Id.
93. Jones, 530 U.S. at 582-83.
94. Id. at 583.
95. Safe districts are those in which the majority of the electorate belongs to one political party
and thereby insures that the candidate of that party will be the district's representative. See Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 116-117 (1986) (explaining that parties accused of political
gerrymandering are those that apportion legislative districts in a manner that concentrates voters of
one political party into a minimum number of districts-thereby diluting that party's representation in
the legislature-or that splits one political party's members into districts where the opposition has a
narrow but safe majority). Proponents of more open primary systems claim that the primary election
is the only time that minorities in a safe district have any chance of effecting the district's
representation. Brief for Respondent at 44-45, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
96. Jones, 530 U.S. at 583.
97. Id.
98. Brief for Respondent at 44, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).




ruled the Court, the blanket primary narrowed voters' choices to candidates
with more centrist views." Increasing available candidates favored by the
majority was simply not compelling to the Court. °3 Justice Scalia
summarily dismissed Respondents' interest in increased voter participation
as suffering the same defect as the previous interest."' Finally, the Court
addressed the privacy interest offered by the state."' Party affiliation was
not a private matter in other contexts, noted Justice Scalia who found the
interest was not compelling.'"
The Jones Court found Proposition 198 was not narrowly tailored to
meet any of the state's interests, whether compelling or not, and that a more
constitutionally appropriate means to achieve the state's ends was a
nonpartisan blanket primary.'" Justice Scalia outlined the parameters of the
nonpartisan blanket primary, noting that it was similar to a blanket primary
in that each voter could cast a vote for any candidate regardless of the
candidate's or voter's party affiliation. The difference was that the top two
or three winners of a nonpartisan blanket primary then advanced to the
general election without regard to their party affiliation."° In essence, the
nonpartisan blanket primary would not determine parties' nominees but
would determine who advanced to the general election ballot."' In
conclusion, the Majority reiterated that California's blanket primary was
unconstitutional."'
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy agreed with the Court's holding but added credence to
California's asserted interest in increasing voter participation."2 He stated
that because voter participation and interest may have increased after
California instituted the blanket primary, the law was positive in many
respects."3 The burden created by Proposition 198, however, was incurable,
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 584-85.
105. Id. at 585.
106. Id. Justice Scalia listed several federal statutes in which a person's party affiliation must be
divulged including: Federal Communications Commission, Board of Directors of the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission statutes that limit the number




110. Id. at 585-86. This type of primary creates a conflict in a jurisdiction that requires parties to
determine nominees in a primary election-a requirement that the Court upheld as valid. Id. at 572.
111. Id. at586.
112. Id. at 586-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 587 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Brief for Respondents at 45-46, Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)).
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and Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion to note that one remedy
California offered to political parties-using financial resources to market the
candidate they preferred-was not available due to campaign finance laws.'
Prior Court decisions limited the amount of money a political party could
spend to support a preferred candidate."' Justice Kennedy opined that
upholding the blanket primary under the assumption that parties could
adequately market their preferred nominee, would compound the injury done
to political parties from the Court limitation on their spending power."'
Thus, he concurred and invalidated California's blanket primary to avoid
any further infringement of political parties' First Amendment rights."7
C. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented."' Stevens
remarked that although he believed the blanket primary did not violate the
First Amendment with regard to the selection of state officials, the strictures
of the Elections Clause' 9 raised the issue of whether the blanket primary
created a violation when used for the selection of federal senators and
representatives.' Before addressing the Elections Clause issue, Stevens
turned first to the majority's analysis.'2 '
1. Political Parties' Status As Public 'Or Private
Justice Stevens implied that political parties' status as either private or
public was determined according to the functions they were performing.'
Thus,
[w]hen a political party defines the organization and composition of
its governing units, when it decides what candidates to endorse, and
114. Id. at 588 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 587-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 626 (1996) and Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action
Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 405-06 (2000) in which Justice Kennedy dissented in part and in whole
respectively because he believed any limitation on political parties' campaign spending was an
unjustified infringement of the First Amendment freedom of speech).
116. Id. at 589 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 590 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
118. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
120. Jones, 530 U.S. at 590 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 591 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 591-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
when it decides whether and how to communicate those
endorsements to the public, it is engaged in the kind of private
expressive associational activity that the First Amendment
protects. 23
Justice Stevens distinguished those activities from involvement in
primary elections that were "quintessential forms of state action" because
states could mandate, '24  primarily finance, and administer primary
elections.' 5  Involvement in state actions meant that political parties'
freedom of association was not absolute and thus, could be limited to allow
non-affiliated voters to participate in a party's primary election. 6 Justice
Stevens asserted that the blanket primary did not offend the First
Amendment but rather attempted to give it depth by increasing voters'
ability to "participate in the democratic process."'2 7  Although Justice
Stevens did not find a violation of the First Amendment, he considered the
state's asserted interests.' 8
2. Compelling State Interests
The state interests advanced support a conclusion that any burden on
parties' associational rights is outweighed by compelling state interests,
argued Justice Stevens. 129  He first reiterated that the burden on political
parties was not severe because there was no evidence of raiding30 and little
evidence of crossover voting, 3' that would indicate that a party's nominee
was actually chosen by non-affiliated members. 32  Justice Stevens went on
to criticize the majority for their short treatment of what he considered
123. Id. at 592 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 594. Stevens argued that the freedom to limit one's association did not allow political
parties to limit the electorate but should instead be asserted "to enable a party to insist on choosing
its nominees at a convention or caucus where nonmembers could be excluded." Id. at 596 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Thus, the current law, allowing states to require primaries as the form of nominee
selection, coupled with the blanket primary created a constitutional conflict, but the blanket primary
alone did not. See id. at 596-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 595-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 595-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 598-600 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 599 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that "raiding" described the scenario when a
non-affiliated voter chose a candidate in a primary because she or he would likely lose the general
election against the voter's preferred elected official).
131. Id. at 599-600 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the district court's finding that experience
with a blanket primary in Washington and other evidence 'suggest[ed] that.there will be particular
elections in which there will be a substantial amount of cross-over voting ... although the cross-over
vote will rarely change the outcome of any election and in the typical contest will not be at
significantly higher levels than in open primary states.'). Id.
132. Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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compelling state interests, namely, nominating candidates more
representative of the electorate, expanding choice, and increasing voter
participation.'3 3 Finally, Justice Stevens' regarded as compelling the state's
interest in giving preference to the decision of nearly sixty percent of voters-
"including a majority of registered Democrats and Republicans"-by
upholding the popularly adopted blanket primary.' Consequently, Justice
Stevens dissented, holding California's blanket primary did not severely
burden political parties' constitutional rights and compelling state interests
outweighed any incidental burden.35
3. Federal Elections Clause Requirements
Finally, Justice Stevens, in dicta, addressed what he thought was a fatal
blow to the state in some elections.' 36  The Elections Clause of the
Constitution provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof."37 A blanket primary adopted by popular
initiative and not by the legislature-like Proposition 198 in California-may
be an invalid method of establishing the manner of election of federal
senators and representatives.38 Such a primary would run directly contrary
to the strictures of the Elections Clause, which require that the legislature,
not a popular vote, determine the manner of elections.'39 Stevens asserted,
therefore, that California's blanket primary was arguably unconstitutional
with regard to the election of federal congressmen and women, but he
133. Id. at 600 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that empirical data presented at trial indicated that
there was higher voter turnout in states implementing a blanket primary than in states mandating
either open or closed primaries).
134. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 226 n. 15 (1989), in which Justice Stevens concurred and in which an analogous
argument was made by California. The Eu Court rejected the state's argument that "[California]
need not show that its endorsement ban [prohibiting parties from endorsing primary candidates]
serves a compelling state interest because the political parties have 'consented' to it. In support of
this claim, California observes that the legislators who could repeal the ban belong to political
parties .... Eu, 489 U.S. at 226 note 15. The Eu Court rejected this argument by stating that (1)
consent of a party did not allow violation of the party's constitutional rights; (2) the lawsuit itself
was evidence of a lack of consent; and (3) simply being a registered party member did not mean that
legislators were acting in a representative capacity for the party at all times. Id.
135. Jones, 530 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
138. Jones, 530 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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reserved judgment because neither the parties nor lower courts had raised the
issue."'
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Validity of Primary Election Systems
1. The Blanket Primary
Partisan blanket primaries in California, Washington, and Alaska were
invalidated by the Court's decision in Jones.'' One impact of the Court's
decision is that any benefits linked with the blanket primary format will be
lost. ' From a normative viewpoint it is difficult to determine what type of
primary is preferable. The adherents to the blanket primary, however, claim
that more open primaries are desirable because they result in the election of
candidates who are more reflective of the electorate and who are,
accordingly, more moderate.' 3 Indeed, objective studies have ascertained
that the more open the primary form, the more likely that the elected official
will support moderate views.'
Empirical data shows that at least some of the anticipated benefits of the
blanket primary in California did come to fruition.45 "All other things being
equal, the blanket primary aided in the election of slightly more moderate
candidates."''46  Additionally, in California's 1998 primary, overall voter
turnout increased 1.2% from the preceding midterm election and 2.4% from
the average turnout of midterm elections.' 47 Significantly, "[tihe number of
140. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 586, 599.
142. Id. at 597-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Brief for Respondent at 39-40, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
144. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and Representation, 14
J.L. ECON & ORG. 304, 322 (1998).
145. See Persily, supra note 14, at 34.
146. Id. (citing BRUCE E. CAIN & ELISABETH R. GERBER eds., VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT
LINE: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIMENT WITH THE BLANKET PRIMARY (2001)). Proponents of the blanket
primary make a distinction and claim that the election of moderate candidates is a benefit only to the
extent that these more moderate candidates better represent a moderate electorate. Brief for
Respondent at 39-40, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
147. Id. at 35. Alaska experienced one of its lowest voter turnouts in its 2000 primary election.
Turnout for 2000 Primary is Lowest Ever, ELECTION NEWS (Alaska Div. Of Elections, Juneau,
Alaska), Sept. 2000, at 1, available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/news/primary.htm.
Officials determined that low turnouts were due to voter confusion caused by the change in Alaska's
primary system. Id. After the Supreme Court's decision in Jones, Alaska modified its primary
system by giving voters a choice between two ballots. Id.
Under the emergency regulations, choices for the Open or Republican ballot had these
requirements attached to them: All candidates except Republicans appeared on the Open
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voters voting in minor party primaries skyrocketed. As compared to the
historic mean, the 1998 minor party primaries had between 3 and 30 times
the number of voters traditionally participating in them."'' 8
Contrary to arguments made by opponents of the blanket primary, many
of the anticipated negative impacts were not evident.' 9 In each election,
there were a significant number of voters-fifteen to twenty percent-that
crossed over, and "[m]ost voters ... crossed over at least once on the
ballot. .. .""o These crossover votes, however, were sincere and not the
result of organized, strategic raiding.' This was evidenced by the fact that
"[m]ost voters who crossed over into the opposing party for the primary
appear to have continued to support that party's nominee in the general
election."'' 2 Further, because the most viable explanation for crossover
voting was incumbency, the fear that non-affiliated voters would chose a
candidate different from the party's preference did not come to fruition.' 3
Although the blanket primary in California lived up to many of its
expectations, long-term effects cannot be known because the Supreme Court
invalidated the blanket primary after only one election.'54
2. The Open Primary
Attenuated distinctions between various primary systems may indicate
that open primaries, used by a majority of states, are at risk as well. 5 The
ballot. Any registered voter could vote that ballot. Only Republican candidates appeared
on the Republican ballot. To vote that ballot, a voter's party affiliation had to be
Republican, Undeclared or Non-Partisan. Voters were permitted to change their party
affiliation in order to receive this ballot.
Id. at 2.
148. Persily, supra note 14, at 34.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Id. Raiding occurs when a voter strategically changes party affiliations in a primary election
in order to cast a vote for an opposing party's weakest candidate, hoping to advance a nominee who
has little chance of winning the general election. Susan Yarborough Noe, North Carolina General
Assembly Amends Election Laws to Allow Unaffiliated Voters To Vote In Party Primaries, 66 N.C.L.
REV. 1208, 1213 (1988).
152. Persily, supra note 14, at 34.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 35.
155. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 598 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Contra
Constitutionality of the Arizona Open Primary Law, Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen. No. 100-019 (Aug. 11,
2000) (stating that Arizona's open primary was not invalidated by California Democratic Party v.
Jones because the Court did not rule on the constitutionality of open primaries and because the open
primary was not as great a burden on political parties' rights and consequently, should be subject to
the less stringent test applied in Timmons).
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rights upheld by the Jones Court, as Stevens observed in his dissent, turned
only on the timing of a voter's party registration.' 6 Open primaries only
require that a voter associate with a political party on the day of voting.'57
"'As Party affiliation becomes ... easy for a voter to change [shortly before
a particular primary election] in order to participate in [that] election, the
difference between open and closed primaries loses its practical
significance."" 8  Consequently, for the same reasons that the Court
invalidated the blanket primary, so too could they render the open primary
obsolete.' 9 Furthermore, open primaries will not be saved by compelling
state interests because the same interests that the Court invalidated in Jones
support open primaries."0
B. Nonpartisan Blanket Primaries: Diminishing Party Power
Although Jones is seemingly a victory for political parties, the
nonpartisan blanket primary, supported by Scalia as a narrowly tailored
means to further state interests, may actually undermine political parties'
power to place nominees on the general ballot. ' In a nonpartisan blanket
primary the top vote-getters, regardless of party affiliation, advance to the
general ballot.'62 In that manner, voters are not selecting parties' nominees
but are merely choosing final candidates.' 63  It is logical then that two
candidates from the same major party may advance or that only candidates
from minor parties may advance.6 4 Either result would deal a serious blow
to the losing political party.
In California, there are currently two ways for political parties to get
their candidates on the general ballot.' 65 Candidates may either
156. Id. at 596-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 598 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Democratic Party of the United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 133 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
159. Id. at 597-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. See id.
161. Instituting a nonpartisan blanket primary, which is currently followed in Louisiana, will be
the next battle for proponents of the Proposition 198 ballot initiative. See Edward Walsh & David S.
Broder, Justices Reject "Blanket" Setup for Primaries; California Found to Violate Parties' Right to
Choose, WASH. POST, June 27, 2000 at AOl (reporting that "Representative Tom Campbell (R-Cal.),
the major sponsor of the ballot initiative that was invalidated yesterday, said he will try to qualify a
ballot measure to adopt the Louisiana system."); see also Frank J. Murray & Andrew Canin,
Supreme Court Overturns California's "Blanket Primary," WASH. TIMES, June 27, 2000 at A13
(stating that "[slupporters of the blanket-primary system, including Gov. Gray Davis, a Democrat
and Secretary of State Bill Jones, a Republican, pledged separately to seek an alternative that will
preserve voters' choices and meet the court's approval.").
162. Jones, 530 U.S. at 585.
163. Id. at 586.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 569-70.
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receive the nomination of a qualified political party by winning its
primary, or [the candidate] may file as an independent by obtaining
(for a statewide race) the signatures of one percent of the State's
electorate or (for other races) the signatures of three percent of the
voting population of the area represented by the office in
contest ....166
If states take Justice Scalia's advice and implement the constitutionally
acceptable nonpartisan blanket primary, political parties' power to place
candidates on the general ballot is greatly diminished. The most
advantageous result for political parties would have been a Supreme Court
decision that invalidated the blanket primary only when it was combined
with state law that also mandated primaries as the form of general ballot
candidate selection. Perhaps that would have given parties the needed legal
precedent to argue that the caucus or convention, where non-affiliated
members could not participate, are the only manner to give parties'
associational rights any meaning.167  States would be put to a choice of
allowing political parties to select nominees in a non-primary forum or
amending their primary election laws to open or closed systems. Now,
however, the Court has reiterated that states may force parties to avail
themselves to primaries as the form of nominee selection,16' and the Court
has condoned the non-partisan blanket primary-a decidedly anti-party form
of candidate selection. 69
C. Judicial Review of Initiatives
A third possible implication from the Court's decision in Jones is
reinvigoration of competing groups who argue respectively, that the
initiative process should be reformed or that the standard for judicial review
of initiatives should be stricter. The initiative process is a means whereby
citizens directly implement new laws or amendments to the state constitution
first, by obtaining the requisite number of signatures to allow the initiative
access to the ballot and second, by voting favorably to adopt the measure."'
166. Id.
167. See id. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 572.
169. Id. at 585-86.
170. Caroline Tolbert et al., The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the American
States, 4-5 (2000), at http://pro.harvard.edu/abstracts/036/036015TolbertCar.htm (consolidating
material that was prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Aug. 31-Sept. 3, 2000). For a more in-depth analysis of the use of initiatives in
the United States and California, see REFERENDUMS 67-122 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds.,
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In California, the initiative was adopted'7' in order take power from the
political machine dominated by the interests of the Southern Pacific
Railroad.'72 The initiative process allowed any group of citizens to place any
measure on the ballot as long as they gathered the requisite number of
signatures.' Over the years the use of the initiative has varied, but in the
last twenty years the initiative has become exceedingly popular.'74
"The merits and defects of the citizen initiative process are the subject
of a hotly contested debate in the scholarly and popular literature." '75 Some
argue that reform of the initiative process itself will best protect those
measures enacted by popular vote.'76
They want to build in more checks before a measure goes to voters-
'more opportunities... for informed deliberation, refinement,
compromise, and consensus building (including) the ability to
amend initiatives at various stages of the process, requiring
1980).
171. See Cal. Elec. Code §§ 102, 9000-9015, codified in conjunction with the California
Constitution that states "[tihe legislative power of this State is vested in the California
Legislature ... but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum." CAL.
CONST. art. IV § 1.
172. JIM SHULTZ, THE INITIATIVE COOKBOOK: RECIPES AND STORIES FROM CALIFORNIA'S
BALLOT WARS 1 (1998); see also ALICE SHADER ET AL., PEOPLE'S LOBBY, NATIONAL INITIATIVE
AND VOTE OF CONFIDENCE (RECALL): TOOLS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 16 (Joyce Koupal & Edwin
Koupal eds., 2d ed. 1975).
173. SHULTZ, supra note 172, at 1. When voters adopted the initiative in 1911 the law required
that proponents of an initiative amass "signatures equal to 8% of the voters in the most recent
election for governor." Id. Later the percentage was changed to 5%, "which in 1996 amounted to
more than 430,000 signatures." Id.
174. Id. at 3.
Prior to 1980 Californians approved an average of only one in three ballot initiatives.
From 1980 to 1990 voters approved nearly half.... In November 1996 voters will cast
ballots on more initiatives than in all of the elections of the 1960s combined. With the
Legislature in a state of almost complete partisan paralysis, the initiative has become the
center stage for shaping the course of state policy.
Id.
175. Tolbert, supra note 170, at 4 (stating that "proponents of direct democracy argue that
allowing citizens to vote directly on policy questions should increase citizen participation, citizen
efficacy and trust in government, while opponents argue that the process has little impact ....
[Initiatives] weaken state legislatures, tyrannize minority groups, and even supplant representative
democracy." (citations omitted)); see also Philip Bentley, Note, Armatta v. Kitzhaber: A New Test
Safeguarding the Oregon Constitution From Amendment by Initiative, 78 OR. L. REV. 1139 (1999)
(stating
"[t]here are a variety of reasons behind the recent bounty of measures appearing on the
ballot. However, one implication is clear; individuals and political action groups with the
financial resources to sell a proposal directly to the voters are able to substitute the
deliberate and often cumbersome legislative process with bumper-sticker slogans and
thirty-second television commercials.").
176. Peter Schrag, The Initiative, the Courts and the Crocodile in the Bathtub, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REPORT, Sept. 2000, at 3, available at
http://www.igs.berkeley.edu:8880/publications/par/Sept2000/shrag.html.
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supermajority approval, at least for constitutional amendments, or
integrating the legislature into the initiative process' (as is the case
in most other states).177
Other reformers focus on limiting the influence of wealthy, special
interest groups by restricting initiative campaign financing or disclosing to
the public the source of large campaign contributions.
78
A second means to protect the initiative has been suggested. Focusing
on post-implementation and the judiciary, some argue in favor of limiting
judicial power to overturn initiatives and claim that due to the nature of the
initiative-a measure adopted directly by the populace and not by
representatives-it should be subject to a more stringent standard of review.'
Stricter standards are favored because the initiative process may have some
palpable advantages; for instance, states that frequently exercise the
initiative process have higher voter turnout for presidential and midterm
elections.' In addition, voters have a greater stake in laws passed by
initiative than in laws passed by the legislature."'
Notwithstanding the support that initiatives generate, in nearly forty
years, more than half of all initiatives in California, Oregon, Washington,
and Colorado were litigated and courts "invalidated (in whole or in part) half
of those that were challenged."'82 The many judges who have participated in
those decisions, however, have been mindful of the political ramifications.'83
State court judges are especially subject to the pressures of populism
because voters often have to reconfirm their positions.'84 Nonetheless, as the
177. Id.
178. SHULTZ, supra note 172, at 89-90. Based on the prices that professional circulation firms
charged in 1974 and the necessary number of signatures, it would cost $130,000 - $260,000 to gather
the requisite number of signatures to place an initiative on the ballot. ALICE SHADER ET AL.,
PEOPLE'S LOBBY, NATIONAL INITIATIVE AND VOTE OF CONFIDENCE (RECALL): TOOLS FOR SELF-
GOVERNMENT, 20 (Joyce Koupal & Edwin Koupal eds., 2d ed. 1975). Thus, small groups with
limited resources are not able to finance the balloting of an initiative and "[t]he reform set up to
overcome the power of the wealthy interests [the initiative] is now dominated by wealthy interests."
SHULTZ, supra, at 89.
179. Craig B. Holman & Robert Stem, Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of
State and Federal Courts, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1239, 1261 (1998) (proposing that federal review of
voter initiatives be conducted by a three judge panel). But see Richard L. Hasen, Judging the Judges
of Initiatives: A Comment on Holman and Stern, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1267 (1998) (arguing that the
appellate process already provides a forum for more stringent review of ballot initiatives).
180. Tolbert, supra note 170, at 19-20.
181. Holman & Stem, supra note 179, at 1263.
182. Schrag, supra note 176, at 2 (citing a scholastic paper written by Kenneth Miller, attorney
and doctoral student in political science at University of California Berkeley).
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus who acknowledged the political
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initiative process becomes more prevalent, and courts exercise their vital and
hallowed duty of judicial review, disenchantment with the legal system is
likely to increase.'85 Judicial invalidation of initiatives can lead to "voter
backlash-both against the initiative process and the judicial system."'86
Ramifications of invalidating an initiative are arguably more serious
than invalidation of other legislation.'87 Where the initiative concerns
regulation of political parties, judicial invalidation is especially acute.'88
This is due to the fact that initiatives are often the tool used by the electorate
to adopt measures while bypassing legislative and political party bias and
entrenchment. '89
When voters feel at once empowered by and disenchanted with the
initiative process, they may think it irrelevant that courts are often the
champions of the initiative process.'" Courts have
[T]ossed out most state legislative attempts to regulate [the
initiative], holding unconstitutional not only attempts to outlaw paid
signature gathering but most other laws requiring petition
circulators to be registered or even to identify themselves. [Courts
have] also ruled that any attempt to limit spending or contributions
to initiative campaigns violates the First Amendment.""
These protections may, likewise, matter little to proponents of stricter
judicial standards. In fact, the very protection afforded the initiative process
by the courts may signal the process' candidacy for stricter judicial review.
Jones is one example of judicial willingness to overturn ballot initiatives
despite the fact that "sixty-nine percent of Independents, sixty-one percent of
pressures on judges who have to rule on the validity of popular initiatives and noted that trying to
ignore the pressure was "like finding a crocodile in your bathtub when you go to shave in the
morning. You try not to think about it, but it's hard to think about much else.").
185. Id. The public's animus toward a system that would disregard its vote was demonstrated on
January 20, 2000 when President Elect George W. Bush was inaugurated and thousands turned out
in protest because the popular vote for Al Gore exceeded the popular vote for Bush. Sue Anne
Pressley, One Nation, Still Divided Over Closeness of Election; Across the Country Bush Garners
Protest, Approval, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at A22.
186. Holman & Stern, supra note 179, at 1263 (citing for example Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839,
844 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) where "[t]he judicial system was
especially cast in a poor light when Judge Stephen Reinhart of the Ninth Circuit invalidated
Proposition 140 on state term limits, claiming that voters did not understand the initiative."). Contra
Richard L. Hasen, Judging the Judges of Initiatives: A Comment on Holman and Stern, 31 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1272 (1998) (claiming that Bates is a good example of where the en bane review
of a prior decision provided the protections needed for initiatives without having to adopt a stricter
standard of review).
187. Holman & Stem, supra note 179, at 1263.
188. Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100 COLUM. L. REV. 731,
749 (2000).
189. Id.
190. Schrag, supra note 176, at 3.
191. Id.
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Democrats, and fifty-seven percent of Republicans" supported the
measure.'92 This case is more fuel for those that argue greater protections
should be given to initiatives whether they support stricter judicial standards
of review or reform of the initiative process itself.'93
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in California Democratic Party v. Jones invalidated
the partisan blanket primary as an unjustified, severe burden on political
parties' freedom of association,' Proponents of the blanket primary will
likely seek to advance their interests by other means; interests such as
increasing voter participation, providing greater choice to voters, and
electing officials more reflective of the moderate populace may give
advocates of the blanket primary incentive to adopt the nonpartisan blanket
primary and reform of the judicial review of initiatives-especially those that
regulate political parties. Minor distinctions between primary systems may
motivate political parties to fight for the invalidation of open primaries and
the reinstatement of caucuses or conventions as the means of political party
candidate nomination. Whatever the continued effects of Jones, we can only
hope that the non-partisan spirit from the constitutional battle will outlive
the partisan litigation-the fruit of the highly contested, presidential election-
'
95long enough to truly reform all of tfie election laws and procedures that
faltered in 2000.
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